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COMMENT 
WHEN DOES DISCRIMINATION 
"OCCUR ?": 
THE SUPREME COURT'S LIMITATION 
ON AN EMPLOYEE'S ABILITY TO 
CHALLENGE DISCRIMINATORY PAY 
UNDER TITLE VII 
INTRODUCTION 
After working for the same company for over fifteen years and just 
before her retirement, Violet discovered that she was earning only sixty 
percent of what her male co-workers were making.' Violet, an employee 
of Tiremaker, had no reason to suspect such a significant discrepancy in 
her pay because she was fIrst hired at a starting salary equivalent to other 
employees in the same position, both male and female. She had 
performed well in her job and received a raise each year, based on her 
supervisor's evaluation and recommendation. 
Violet had been working for Tiremaker for a few years, when her 
supervisor started making sexual advances towards her. He repeatedly 
asked her out to dinner, commented on how her business suits fit the 
curves of her body, and asked her to meet him in the copy room for "a 
good time you'll never forget." Violet spurned his many requests to 
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engage in intimate acts in the workplace, and he eventually moved on to 
harassing the newer and younger employees. 
Mter the incidents subsided, Violet continued to receive small 
raises each year. Tiremaker managers consistently warned employees to 
"keep their mouths shut" about pay, so she never knew what kind of 
raises, if any, her co-workers had received. It was not until the day of 
Tiremaker's holiday party, in the last few months of Violet's 
employment, that she discovered the reality of her low pay. One of 
Violet's more talkative co-workers, Grant, told Violet how much he 
made and about the great raise he had just received. Since Grant's salary 
was so much more than Violet's, she began to ask whether anyone else 
was also making so much more than she made. Because employees were 
reluctant to violate company policy and discuss their salaries, it took 
Violet several months to get more information about salaries of other 
account managers. She eventually learned that she was making forty 
percent less than her male counterparts. Violet immediately consulted an 
attorney to find out what she could do about the economic harm she 
suffered as a result of the inequity. Yet, on the day she discovered the 
discriminatory pay, she was already barred from bringing a claim for pay 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 because 
the decision to pay her, which was based on unlawful sex discrimination, 
happened more than 180 days ago. 
This is the predicament plaintiffs face following the Supreme 
Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. 3 
Prior to the Ledbetter decision, courts had allowed plaintiffs to file 
claims for discriminatory pay on the basis of paychecks received within 
the administrative filing limitations period, regardless of when the 
discriminatory pay decision was first made.4 Yet, in the majority opinion 
by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court held that the pay-setting 
decision is the "discrete act" of discrimination, and thus the time period 
2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I). The Civil Rights Act of 
1991 (Pub. L. No. 102-166) (CRA) amends several sections of Title VII. In addition, section 102 of 
the Civil Rights Act amends the revised statutes by adding a new section following section 1977 (42 
U.S.c. § 1981), to provide for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in cases of 
intentional violations of Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and section 501 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
3 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., _U.S._, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007). Justice 
Alito wrote the majority decision, in which he was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, while Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens dissented. 
4 H.R. Rep. No. 110-237 (2007); The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007: Hearing Before 
the House Education and Labor Committee, II0th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (written testimony of 
Deborah Brake, Law Professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, at 13) 
2
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for filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC") begins when the act occurs.5 Thus, the Court's ruling in 
Ledbetter provides that a plaintiff does not state a claim cognizable under 
Title VII when she alleges that she is receiving discriminatory low pay at 
the time she files a claim, based on prior discriminatory denials of 
appropriate salary increases, unless the actual pay-setting decision was 
made within the limited filing period.6 
This Comment contends that the Court's holding in Ledbetter marks 
a substantial deviation from the purpose of Title VII-to rectify past and 
prevent future workplace discrimination and provide a remedy for 
economically injured employees-and thereby weakens the prohibition 
against discrimination in the workplace.7 The Court's failure to consider 
the hidden nature of discriminatory pay claims significantly limits 
employees' ability to challenge disparate pay under Title VII. This 
comment asserts that discrimination "occurs" with each paycheck that 
delivers discriminatorily low pay. 
Part I of this Comment explains the congressional intent and 
purpose in establishing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
and required administrative procedures for filing a Title VII claim of 
discrimination. It also discusses the different types of discrimination that 
can give rise to a claim under Title VII and analyzes the development of 
doctrines applied in the adjudication of employment discrimination 
claims prior to Ledbetter. Part II dissects the basis of the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Ledbetter to highlight the tenuous nature of the 
decision. Part ill explains the nature of discriminatory pay claims and 
the prevalence of pay secrecy in today's workplace to demonstrate how 
the Ledbetter Court ignored the reality of disparate pay. Part IV 
describes the implications of Ledbetter on employees and employers, as 
well as on future litigation of disparate pay claims. Part V identifies a 
door left open by the Court that allows plaintiffs to apply the discovery 
rule in Title VII actions, thereby delaying the start of the administrative 
filing period until the plaintiff is reasonably aware of the discrimination 
occurring with each disparate paycheck. Part V also examines the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, the legislative response to five controversial 
Supreme Court opinions in 1989, which, like Ledbetter, unduly limited 
5 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165. 
6 1d. 
7 See H.R. Rep. No. 88-914 (1963) (stating the purpose of Title VII is "to eliminate, through 
the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on 
race, color, religion, or national origin"); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 
(1975) (discussing back pay as a remedy to fulfill the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for 
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination). 
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an employee's ability to file legitimate claims for discrimination in the 
workplace. It further contends that the action taken by Congress in 
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 serves as a model for new 
legislation to ameliorate the consequences of Ledbetter and carry out the 
remedial purpose of Title VII. Such an amendment will ensure that 
employers and employees are aware that discrimination occurs both at 
the time of the pay-setting decision as held by Ledbetter, as well as each 
time compensation is paid pursuant to a discriminatory pay decision. 
Thus, disparate pay claims should be actionable as long as at least one 
paycheck was received within the statutory filing period. Part VI 
concludes by highlighting the negative consequences of Ledbetter and 
stressing the need for congressional action to ultimately restore the 
power of Title VII to rectify and prevent workplace discrimination. 
I. BACKGROUND: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE TIMELY 
FILING REQUIREMENT OF TITLE VII 
In order to identify the changes made by Ledbetter, one must first 
understand what is required to file a charge under Title VII alleging 
employment discrimination. A statutory prohibition against employment 
discrimination was initially established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(hereinafter CRA of 1964),8 and was subsequently amended by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.9 As amended, Title VII outlines 
the administrative procedures for filing a claim of employment 
discrimination under the CRA of 1964. Once a claim has been filed, 
various doctrines determine what must be proven depending upon the 
type of discrimination that is alleged. 
A. TITLE VII OF THE CRA OF 1964 AND THE CORRESPONDING 
ADMINISTRATNE PROCEDURES 
Section 2000e-2(a) of the CRA of 1964 makes it an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer to discriminate "against any 
individual with respect to his compensation... because of such 
indi vidual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 10 The statute 
was enacted as a means of redressing the injustices of racial and other 
discrimination facing the nation. II The passage of Title VII is considered 
8 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw 2008). 
9 Pub. L. No. 92-261. 86 Stat. 103 (1972). available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/ 
35thlthelawl eeo_1972.html. 
\0 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(a) (Westlaw 2008). 
II H.R. Rep. No. 88-914 (1963). reprinted at 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391.2393-94. 
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a defining moment in the nation's dedication to eliminating unequal 
treatment in employment. 12 Title VII authorizes economic and injunctive 
relief for injured employees, to serve as incentives to employers to 
eliminate discriminatory practices within the workplace. 13 An individual 
challenging an employment practice as discriminatory must first meet the 
administrative requirement of filing a charge with the EEOC I4 within 
180 or 300 days after the alleged practice occurred. 15 
Congress intended the EEOC to be the leading enforcement agency 
in workplace discrimination. 16 However, upon its formation, the EEOC 
only had the authority to "receive, investigate, and conciliate 
complaints.,,17 Over five years after the passage of Title VII and the 
creation of the EEOC, protected groups were still besieged by 
widespread discrimination throughout the public and private sector. 18 
Congress responded by passing the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
of 1972,19 which provided the EEOC with the power to litigate against 
public and private employers and labor unions. 20 
12 Tara-Ann Topputo, In Opposition to Applying the Continuing Violation Doctrille to 
Hostile Work Environment Claims: National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 
(2002), 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 449,452 (2002) (quoting Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in 
Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. 
REV. 651, 669 (2000». 
13 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g) (Westlaw 2008) (courts may enjoin an employer from engaging in 
unlawful employment practices and may order reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without 
back pay); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (discussing back 
pay as a remedy to fulfill the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on 
account of unlawful employment discrimination). 
14 See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5 (Westlaw 2008). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to interpret and administer the provisions of Title 
VII. See also JOEL W. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKER, JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 17 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 5th ed. 2001). 
15 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(e)(I) (Westlaw 2008). In states where a state agency has a work-
sharing agreement with the EEOC and discrimination may be covered by state law, the time for 
filing a charge of discrimination is extended from 180 to 300 days. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(e)(I) 
(Westlaw 2008). While most states have anti-discrimination laws, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia and 
Mississippi do not. See Workplace Fairness, Discrimination Claims - State Laws, 
http://www.workplacefairness.orglindex.php?page=minimum (last visited April II, 2008). North 
Carolina has antidiscrimination laws, but none provide a remedy. Therefore an individual can file a 
claim with the North Carolina state agency, but can only enforce the law by bringing a public-policy 
claim in court. See N.C. GEN. STAT § 143-422.2 (2007). 
16 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Pre 1965: Events Leading to the Creation of 
EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35thlpreI965/index.html(last visited April 11,2008). 
17 [d. 
18 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, The 1970s: The "Toothless Tiger" Gets Its 
Teeth-A New Era of Enforcement, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35thlI970slindex.html(last 
visited April 11,2008). 
19 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
20 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, The 1970s: The "Toothless Tiger" Gets Its 
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Congress implemented an administrative remedial scheme intended 
to be easily navigable by unrepresented claimants.21 Yet, while 
providing for administrative relief, Congress also intended that Title VII 
claimants have access to the courts and that the federal courts ultimately 
be responsible for enforcing civil rights. 22 A plaintiff must exhaust 
administrative remedies before establishing jurisdiction for a 
discrimination claim in federal court. 23 In order to exhaust 
administrative remedies, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC 
within the charge-filing period of 180 days after the discriminatory act 
has occurred. 24 This l80-day filing deadline is extended to 300 days if 
the charge is also covered by a state or local anti-discrimination law. 25 
The EEOC is required to notify the employer within ten days of 
receiving the charge and then begin investigating.26 If after investigation 
of the charge, the EEOC determines that there is reasonable cause to 
believe a claim is valid,27 the EEOC may invite the parties to work with 
Teeth-A New Era of Enforcement, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35thlI970slindex.html(last 
visited April II, 2008). The five major provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972 are as follows: (I) the EEOC received litigation authority to sue nongovernmental respondents, 
employers, unions and employment agencies (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)); (2) the EEOC could file 
pattern or practice lawsuits (42 U.S.c. § 2000e-6(e)); (3) title VII coverage was expanded to include 
the federal government and state and local governments (42 U.S.c. § 2000e-16); (4) the number of 
employees needed for Title VII coverage over employers was reduced from 25 to 15 (42 U.S.c. § 
2000e(b)); and (5) the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council, which includes the 
EEOC, the Departments of Justice and Labor, the Civil Service Commission, and the Civil Rights 
Commission, was established to improve efficiency (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14). 
21 See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525 (1972) (finding that the filing procedure 
complied with the intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
22 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson-Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991) (discussing the 
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims brought under the ADEA). 
23 Exhaustion of administrative remedies under Title VII requires that the complainant file a 
timely charge with the EEOC, thereby allowing the agency time to investigate the charge. See 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (Westlaw 2008); see also Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1103-04 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff is required to 
exhaust administrative remedies before seeking adjudication of a Title VII claim); Jones v. Runyon, 
91 F.3d 1398, 1399 (10th Cir. 1996) (exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to suit under Title VII); Vinieratos v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 939 F.2d 762, 767-68 
(9th Cir. 1991) (whether claimant has exhausted administrative remedies is a question of law 
reviewable de novo). 
24 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(e)(I) (Westlaw 2008). The employee must file a charge "within one 
hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." {d. 
25 {d. If the employee has filed with a State or local agency with "authority to grant or seek 
relief from such practice," the employee must file the charge with the EEOC "within three hundred 
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice" or "within thirty days after receiving notice 
that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law." See also 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Filing a Charge of Employment Discrimination, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview_charge_filing.html(last visited April 11,2008). 
26 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b). 
27 A determination of reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred is based upon 
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it to resolve the claim through an informal process of conciliation. 28 
However, if a conciliation agreement is not reached, the EEOC may file 
suit itself or issue a "right to sue" letter within 180 days from the date the 
charge was filed. 29 The right to sue letter is necessary for the 
complainant to file a private action. 3o However, if the EEOC does not 
find reasonable cause, it will dismiss the case but issue a notice 
informing the claimant of the right to file a lawsuit within ninety daYS.31 
B. TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Since the enactment of the eRA of 1964, case law regarding 
discrimination claims brought under Title VII is typically divided into 
two main categories, each with its own method of proof. First, disparate 
treatment theory makes different treatment of individuals based on 
protected group characteristics unlawful. 32 In a disparate treatment case, 
liability depends on whether the protected trait actually motivated the 
employer's decision. 33 The requisite proof of discriminatory motive may 
be inferred from differential treatment. 34 The second category, disparate 
impact theory, prohibits the use of facially neutral employment practices 
that have an adverse effect on members of particular groups and are not 
justified by business necessity. 35 Proof of discriminatory motive is not 
required under disparate impact theory.36 
evidence obtained in investigation. V.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Definition of 
Terms, http://www.eeoc.gov/statsldefine.html(last visited April II, 2008). In determining whether 
reasonable cause exists, the EEOC shall accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made 
by State or local authorities. See 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e5(b) (Westlaw 2008). 
28 See 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (Westlaw 2008). 
29 See 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (Westlaw 2008) (the EEOC provides notice that a civil 
action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge by the person claiming to be 
aggrieved or if such charge was filed by a member of the EEOC, by any person whom the charge 
alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice); see also V.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC's Charge Processing Procedures, 
www.eeoc.gov/chargeloverview_charge_processing.html(last visited Apr. 14, 2008) (stating that a 
charging party can request a notice of "right to sue" from the EEOC 180 days after the charge was 
first filed with the Commission, and may then bring suit within 90 days after receiving this notice). 
30 See 42 V.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (Westlaw 2008). 
31 1d. 
32 See generally William Gordon, The Evolution o/the Disparate Impact Theory o/Title VII: 
A Hypothetical Case Study, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 529 (2007). The term "protected group" refers to 
classifications statutorily protected from discrimination under the CRA of 1964 including race, 
color, religion, sex and national origin. See 42 V.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (Westlaw 2008). 
33 Teamsters v. Vnited States, 431 V.S. 324, 335, n. 15 (1977) (construing Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
34 ld. 
35 See id. 
36 1d. 
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In Ledbetter, the plaintiff asserted a claim of disparate treatment, 
thus requiring a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the 
employer through direct or circumstantial evidence. 37 Within disparate 
treatment and disparate impact discrimination cases, various doctrines 
have been applied to prove a claim of employment discrimination. 
In United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, the Supreme Court fIrst addressed 
the concept of continuing violations of discrimination law.38 In 1968, 
Carolyn Evans was forced to resign from her position as a flight 
attendant for United Air Lines (hereinafter "United") because United 
refused to employ married flight attendants. 39 At that time, she did not 
me a charge with the EEOC challenging her termination.40 Evans was 
rehired in 1972, after United had rescinded its "no marriage" policy.41 
However, she was treated as a new employee for seniority purposes.42 
Evans sued under Title VII asserting that United's failure to credit her 
with seniority for her prior service perpetuated into the present the 
effects of its prior illegal discrimination.43 The Supreme Court 
recognized that the decision not to credit Evans' prior service had an 
adverse continuing impact on her pay and fringe benefits, but stated that 
"the crucial issue was whether any present violation existed.,,44 It 
concluded that Evans had no viable claim because she failed to file a 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC within the filing period 
mandated by the CRA of 1964.45 The Court further stated: 
A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is 
the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the 
statute was passed.46 It may constitute relevant background evidence 
37 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2007); see, e.g., Watson 
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1002 (1988) ("[A] disparate-treatment challenge focuses 
exclusively on the intent of the employer."); Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1182 (11 th 
Cir. 2001) ("Disparate treatment claims require proof of discriminatory intent ... through [either] 
direct or circumstantial evidence."). 
38 United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). 
39/d. 
40 [d. at 554-55. 
41 [d. at 555. 
42 [d. 
43 [d. 
44 Evans, 431 U.S. at 578. 
45 [d. at 558. The applicable time limit in February 1972 was 90 days; effective March 24, 
1972, this limit was extended to 180 days. Section 706(d), 78 Stat. 260,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d), 
then provided in part: "A charge under subsection (a) shall be filed within ninety days after the 
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred .... " The 1972 amendments to Title VII added a 
new subsection (a) to § 706. Subsection (d) was redesignated as subsection (e) and it was amended 
to enlarge the limitations period to 180 days. See 86 Stat. 105,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 
46 Evans, 431 U.S. at 558. 
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in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue, but 
separately considered, "it is merely an unfortunate event in history 
which has no present legal consequences.,,47 
257 
Essentially, as to the conduct that was a violation-the discriminatory 
company policy against employing married flight attendants-Evans had 
not filed a timely charge. Regarding the conduct that still affected her, 
United's failure to recognize seniority, the Court found no violation 
because the employer was not engaged in discriminatory practices at the 
time Evans brought suit. 
As in Evans, the plaintiff in Delaware State College v. Ricks failed 
to establish a continuing violation. The plaintiff, a college librarian, was 
denied tenure but did not file a charge with the EEOC until more than a 
year after being informed that he would be terminated.48 The plaintiff 
argued his charge was timely because the unlawful employment practice 
of which he complained-his termination-did not occur until a later 
date that fell within the administrative filing period.49 The Court rejected 
that position, holding that the limitations period commenced when he 
learned that he had been denied tenure and therefore would be 
terminated at the end of the year. 50 The Supreme Court held that the 
statute of limitations started to run on the date a tenure decision was 
made and communicated to the employee.51 Thus, Ricks established that 
a violation occurs when the discriminatory decision is made and 
communicated, not when its effects are felt. In Evans and Ricks, the 
Supreme Court held there was no continuing violation where the effects 
of prior discriminatory acts, but no actual discrimination, occurred within 
the limitations period. 52 Thus, these cases effectively bar claims where 
47/d. 
48 Delaware Slate College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,254-55 (1980). 
49 [d. at 254. 
50/d. at 258. 
51 [d. at 259. 
52 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(I) (West law 2008) requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a charge 
with the EEOC either 180 or 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred. 
Thus, the administrati ve filing period commences on the date of the alleged discrete discriminatory 
act or the last of a series of individual acts that constitute a hostile work environment, in which case 
the unlawful employment practice cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It does not matter 
that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the slatutory time 
period as long as an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time 
period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining 
liability. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002). Therefore courts will 
identify the date a charge is filed with the EEOC and count backwards (either 180 or 300 days 
according to the Slate) from the filing date to determine whether or not the alleged discrimination 
occurred within that time period. 
9
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the relevant aspect of the employment system, such as promotion, 
seniority, or termination decision, is facially neutral, and any discrete 
discriminatory conduct took place and ceased outside the period of 
limitations. 
However, the Supreme Court found a present continuing violation 
in Bazemore v. Friday, in which it held that an employer had committed 
an unlawful employment practice every time it issued unequal pay for 
similarly situated black and white employees. 53 The Court found a 
violation of Title VII, despite the fact that the discriminatory pay 
decision was made before the passage of the Act, because the employer 
had perpetuated the unequal pay and "was under an obligation to 
eradicate salary disparities based on race that began prior to the effective 
date of Title VII.,,54 The Court held that each and every paycheck that 
continued the past discrimination was actionable not because the 
paychecks were "related" to the decision made outside the limitations 
period, but because the employer discriminated each and every time it 
issued the paychecks.55 According to the Court, "each week's paycheck 
that delivered less to a black than to a similafly situated white is a wrong 
actionable under Title VII. ,,56 Thus, the claims were actionable in 
Bazemore because the discriminatory employment practice occurred 
within the relevant filing period.57 Essentially, under Bazemore, a new 
filing period began with the issuance of each inequitable paycheck based 
on a discriminatory decision. The Court's holding was consistent with 
Evans, as Bazemore focused on the current salary structure, finding it 
illegal if it is a continuation of the discriminatory pay structure. Lower 
courts applied Bazemore in discriminatory compensation cases to find 
that each paycheck, rather than the initial setting of the discriminatory 
salary, constitutes a violation. 58 Therefore, under the continuing 
53 Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 386-87 (1986). 
54 [d. at 387. 
55 [d. at 395-96; see also Amanda J. Zaremba, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan: 
The Filing Quandary for Legally Ill-Equipped Employees and Eternally Liable Employers, 72 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1129, 1151 (2004). 
56 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395. 
57 Zaremba, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. at 1152. 
58 Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1010 (10th Cir. 2002) (reversing the 
district court's dismissal of an employee's claim of discriminatory pay, finding that discriminatory 
salary payments constituted fresh violations of Title VII and that each action of pay-based 
discrimination was separately actionable and independent for purposes of statutory time limitations); 
Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251,255 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding plaintiffs claim timely when he had 
received allegedly discriminatory paychecks within 300 days prior to the filing of his administrative 
charge); Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding plaintiff need not show 
that the entire violation of disparate pay occurred within the actionable period as long as plaintiff can 
show discrimination continued into the actionable period). 
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violations doctrine, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of 
the last occurrence of discrimination, or last paycheck, rather than the 
first. 59 
The Supreme Court rejected application of the doctrine of 
continuing violations under Title VII for discrete actions,60 but upheld 
the doctrine for hostile work environment cases in National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation v. Morgan. 61 In Morgan, the plaintiff, a black 
former employee of AMTRAK, ftled a claim under Title VII alleging 
that "he had been subjected to discrete discriminatory and retaliatory acts 
and had experienced a racially hostile work environment throughout his 
employment.,,62 Some of the conduct of which Morgan complained took 
place within the administrative ftling period, but most of the conduct 
predated that period. 63 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff could sue 
on claims related to conduct that occurred not only within the limitations 
period but with respect to actions that "would ordinarily be time barred 
so long as they are either sufficiently related to incidents that fall within 
the statutory period or are part of a systematic policy or practice of 
discrimination that took place, at least in part, within the limitations 
period.,,64 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding that 
an employer could be held liable for discrete acts of discrimination that 
occur outside the limitation period, but upheld that a charge alleging a 
hostile work environment will not be time-barred as long as all acts that 
constitute the claim are part of the same unlawful employment practice 
and at least one act falls within the time period.65 The Supreme Court 
explained that discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, 
denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are "easy to identify.,,66 In contrast to 
59 See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 54 (1st CiT. 1999) (,'The continuing 
violation doctrine ensures that plaintiffs' claims are not foreclosed merely because the plaintiffs 
needed to see a pattern of repeated acts before they realized that the individual acts were 
discriminatory."). 
60 The Supreme Court has explained discrete acts as those that are easy to identify, such as 
the denial of training, termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire. See 
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,114 (2002). 
61 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002); see also H.R. Rep. No. 
110-237, at 20 (2007). 
62 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 104. 
63 1d. at 105. 
64 Morgan v. Nat' I R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th CiT. 2000). 
65 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122. 
66 ld. at 114. Courts interpreting Morgan have subsequently expanded the scope of what 
may constitute a discrete act. See, e.g., Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 893 (9th CiT. 
2005) (refusing to grant vacation requests, requiring plaintiff to obtain medical tests by her own 
treating physician, leaving negative performance evaluations in plaintiffs personnel file and 
instructing plaintiff to enter work site through a back gate); Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1108 
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discrete acts, hostile work environment claims involve repeated conduct, 
occurring over a series of days or years.67 Later events may still be part 
of the same hostile work environment claim, and therefore a claimant 
may file a charge at a later date that still includes the entirety of events.68 
Thus, the Supreme Court made it clear that discrete acts will not be 
considered as forming the basis of a continuing violation even if they are 
related, but that if there is a truly discrete act, the charge-filing period 
will begin to run when that discrete act occurs and will not be affected by 
further discrete acts.69 
Three principles can be derived from this line of cases. First, 
discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable unless a charge filed with 
the EEOC is timely, even if an act is related to acts alleged in timely filed 
charges.7o Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing 
charges.7l Therefore, the charge alleging a discrete act must be filed 
within the applicable time period after the discriminatory conduct 
occurred.72 Second, past acts of discrimination and an employee's prior 
knowledge of their occurrence do not bar the employee from filing 
charges about related discrete acts as long as the acts are independently 
discriminatory and the claim on each act is timely filed. 73 Finally, so 
long as all acts that constitute a claim are part of the same unlawful 
employment practice and at least one act falls within the time period, the 
claim will not be time-barred. 74 
A distinction between filing limitations for discrete acts of 
discrimination and those for ongoing violations, has made it difficult for 
most employees to decipher what constitutes a timely claim, which 
(9th Cir. 2002) (denying favorable assignment of temporary military assignments). 
67 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. 
68 [d. at 117. 
69 However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Morgan has been criticized for "leaving the 
door open" on the question of when a discrete act actually occurs. See Benjamin J. Morris, 
Comment, A Door Left Open? National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan and Its Effect on 
Post-Filing Discrete Acts in Employment Discrimination Suits, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 497 (2007); see 
also Amanda J. Zaremba, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan: The Filing Quandary for 
Legally Ill-Equipped Employees and Eternally liable Employers, 72 U. ON. L. REV. 1129, 1148 
(2004) (discussing the failure of the Court in Morgan to provide guidance as to when a discrete act 
occurs because it was "preoccupied with defining a discrete act and finding that serial acts do not 
make them all timely under the limitations period."). 
70 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122. 
71/d. 
72 See 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Westlaw 2008). 
73 
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105. 
74 [d. at 117 (stating that for claims that cannot be said to occur on any particular day, it does 
not matter that some component acts fall outside of the statutory time period). 
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depends on the type of discrimination alleged. 75 One criticism of the 
division between hostile work environment claims and claims for 
discrete acts is that an employee is much less likely to go through the 
trouble of filing an EEOC charge over a denial of training than an 
employee is to file a charge after being terminated. 76 Daily 
discriminatory actions by employers that are tolerated by employees may 
go unchallenged, thereby allowing employers to escape liability for 
discrimination. 77 
This problem is particularly disconcerting in the area of 
discriminatory pay. Prior to Ledbetter, a split among the federal 
appellate courts had developed over how to deal with disparate pay 
claims under Title VII. The Eleventh Circuit held that the receipt of a 
paycheck allegedly depressed in value because of prior acts of 
discrimination was not an independent act of discrimination.78 However, 
most of the other circuits that have considered the issue have adopted the 
contrary reasoning. 79 The Second Circuit, in Forsyth v. Federation 
Employment and Guidance Service, held that any discriminatory 
paycheck received within the statute of limitations period could be the 
basis for a claim, even if a discriminatory pay scale was established 
outside of the statutory period.8o Similarly, the D.C. Circuit held in Shea 
v. Rice that each week's paycheck that delivers less to a black employee 
than to a similarly situated white employee is a wrong actionable under 
Title VII, regardless of the fact that the discriminatory pay structure 
began prior to the limitations period. 81 Several circuits have recognized 
that a claim of disparate pay is "fundamentally unlike other claims of 
ongoing discriminatory treatment because it involves a series of discrete, 
75 Amanda J. Zaremba, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan: The Filing Quandary 
for Legally [l/·Equipped Employees and Eternally Liable Employers, 72 U. ON. L. REV. 1129, 1155 
(2004). 
76/d. An example is an employee who is denied training on numerous occasions, disciplined 
more harshly than other employees, and eventually terminated. However, by the time he or she files 
the charge for being terminated, the discrete discriminatory act of denying training may be outside 
the limitations period. This is similar in nature to disparate pay, where the decision or performance 
review that denies an employee a raise falls outside the limitations period because the employee is 
unlikely to file a discrimination claim the first time he or she is not given a raise or simply given a 
smaller raise than fellow employees. {d. 
77 {d. at 1155. 
78 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1183 (11th CiT. 2005). 
79 Forsyth v. Fed'n Employment & Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565,573 (2d Cir. 2005); Shea 
v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 453 (~.C. CiT. 2005); Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1010 
(10th CiT. 2002) (recognizing that each race· based discriminatory salary payment constitutes a fresh 
violation of Title VII); Hildebrandt v. Illinois Oep't of Human Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th CiT. 
2003) (each paycheck that includes discriminatory pay is a discrete discriminatory act). 
80 Forsyth, 409 F.3d at 573. 
81 Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 453 (~.C. Cir. 2005). 
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individual wrongs rather than a single and indivisible course of wrongful 
action."s2 Thus, prior to Ledbetter, the majority of circuits struck a 
balance between permitting redress for an ongoing wrong and imposing 
liability for conduct long past. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR 
A. THE FACTS 
Lilly Ledbetter worked as a supervisor from 1979 until 1998 at the 
Gadsden, Alabama, plant of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company 
(hereinafter "Goodyear"). 83 The plant used a merit-based compensation 
system under which salaried employees were given or denied raises 
based on their supervisors' evaluation of their performance.84 In March 
1998, Ledbetter filled out an EEOC questionnaire, alleging specific acts 
of sex discrimination and subsequently filed a formal EEOC charge in 
July. 85 After taking early retirement in November 1998, Ledbetter filed 
an action asserting, among other claims, a Title VII pay discrimination 
claim. 86 The Title VII pay discrimination claim survived a summary-
judgment motion and proceeded to trial. 87 Ledbetter presented evidence 
that, throughout her employment, several supervisors had given her poor 
performance evaluations because of her gender and, therefore, her pay 
had not increased as much as it would have had she been evaluated 
82PoJlis v. New Sch. for Soc. Research, 132 F.3d 115,119 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 
Developments in the Law-Statute of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (1950) ("Each 
continuation or repetition of the wrongful conduct may be a separate cause of action for which suit 
must be brought within the period beginning with its occurrence.")); accord, Goodwin v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1010 (10th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that each race-based 
discriminatory salary payment constitutes a fresh violation of Title VII); Cardenas v. Massey, 269 
F.3d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 2001); Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36 F.3d 336, 347 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying continuing 
violation theory to both Title VII and EPA disparate-pay claims). 
83 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007). 
84 [d. 
85 [d. 
86 [d.; see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1175-76, n. 7 (11th 
Cir. 2005) ("Ledbetter asserted mUltiple claims of age discrimination, sex discrimination, and 
retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (as amended), the Equal Pay 
Act ('EPA'), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (,ADEA'), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Other than her disparate pay claim brought under Title VII, and her age-, sex-, 
and retaliation-based claims relating to her transfer, each of Ledbetter's claims was abandoned or 
dismissed by the district court through summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in favor of 
Goodyear."). 
87 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165. 
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without the underlying discrimination.88 She demonstrated that these 
past pay decisions continued to affect the amount of her pay throughout 
her employment.89 Near the end of Ledbetter's employment she was 
being paid considerably less than any of her male colleagues.9o Finding 
for Ledbetter, the jury awarded back pay and damages. 91 
Goodyear appealed the judgment, arguing that Ledbetter's pay 
discrimination claim was time-barred with respect to all pay decisions 
made prior to 180 days before the filing of her EEOC questionnaire92 and 
that no discriminatory act relating to Ledbetter's pay occurred during the 
180-day period.93 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed, holding that a Title vn pay discrimination claim cannot be 
based on any pay decision that occurred prior to the last pay decision that 
affected the employee's pay during the EEOC filing period.94 Ledbetter 
sought review of the Court of Appeals' holding as to when a plaintiff 
may bring an action for unlawful pay discrimination under Title VII 
when the disparate pay is the result of a discriminatory pay decision that 
occurred outside the statutory limitations period but is received within 
the limitations period.95 
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
In May 2007, the Supreme Court held that Ledbetter's claims failed 
because the limitations period had run by the time she submitted her 
EEOC filing.96 The majority opinion focused on the intent of the 
employer, stating that Ledbetter failed to show that Goodyear 
decisionmakers acted with actual discriminatory intent when they issued 
88 ld. at 2165-66, 2171 ("Ledbetter's claims of sex discrimination turned principally on the 
misconduct of a single Goodyear supervisor. Ledbetter testified the supervisor retaliated against her 
when she rejected his sexual advances during the early 1980's, and did so again in the mid-1990's 
when he falsified deficiency reports about her work. Ledbetter argued that his misconduct was the 




92 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1178 (II th Cir. 2005). The 
parties assumed that the EEOC filing period ran from the date that Ledbetter completed an EEOC 
questionnaire in March 1998, even though Ledbetter's discriminatory pay claim was not added until 
she filed a formal EEOC charge in July 1998. In reliance on the parties' stipulation, the court used 
the questionnaire filing date as Ledbetter's administrative claim filing date. 
93 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2166 (2007). 
94 ld. at 1182-83. 
95 Ledbeller, 127 S. Ct. at 2166 (2007). 
96 ld. at 2171. Specifically, with respect to the alleged discriminatory conduct of falsified 
deficiency reports and unwelcome sexual advances by a supervisor in the early 1980s and mid-
I 990s, the Court found Ledbetter's claims untimely. 
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her paychecks during the EEOC filing period.97 The Court held that her 
claim for discriminatory pay based upon receipt of paychecks was not 
actionable because the limitations period commenced "when the discrete 
act of alleged intentional discrimination occurred, not [on] the date when 
the effects of this practice were felt.,,98 Relying on its decisions in 
Evans, Ricks, and Morgan, the Court held that the EEOC charging period 
is triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes place.99 Therefore, a 
new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not begin, 
upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that are later 
adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination. loo Thus, from the 
Court's perspective, the actionable discrimination could have occurred 
only at the time of the pay-setting decision. 
The majority also concluded that, by creating the relatively short 
EEOC filing period in Title VII, Congress "intended to encourage the 
prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimination."lol The 
Court stressed the unfair burden of "tardy lawsuits," with reference to the 
timely filing provisions of Title VII. 102 The majority noted that 
ultimately, "experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural 
requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of 
evenhanded administration of the law.,,103 The Court referred back to the 
statutory language of Title VII, holding that by operation of the 
enforcement provisions, a Title VII "claim is time-barred if it is not filed 
within these time limits."I04 
Furthermore, the majority opinion disputed Ledbetter's argument 
that the Court had adopted the "paycheck accrual rule" in Bazemore v. 
Friday, under which each paycheck would trigger a new limitations 
period during which a plaintiff may challenge any discriminatory 
conduct that adversely impacted that paycheck, regardless of when the 
97 Jd. at 2167. 
98 Jd. at 2168. 
99 See id. at 2168-69. 
100 /d. at 2169 (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002)). 
IOI/d. at 2170 (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 819-21 (1980), which noted 
that legislative compromises preceded the enactment of Title VII, and to remain respectful of the 
legislative process, full deference must be given to the statute as it was enacted). 
102 /d. at 2171-72 (addressing the dissent's attempt to dismiss the majority's reliance on the 
policy underlying the limitations period, the majority responds that the case illustrates the problems 
created by tardy lawsuits). By the time of the trial, Ledbetter's supervisor had died and therefore 
could not testify. The majority stated that "a timely charge might have permitted his evidence to be 
weighed contemporaneously." Jd. 
103 Jd. (citing Mohasco, 447 U.S. at 826). 
104 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2172 (citing Morgan 536 U.S. at \09); Electrical Workers v. 
Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236 (1976»; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(I), (f)(I) (Westlaw 
2008). 
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conduct occurred. 105 Ledbetter relied on the Court's statement in 
Bazemore that "[e]ach week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than 
to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII."I06 
The Court distinguished the holding in Bazemore by stating that it was 
based on a current violation, the employer's use of a discriminatory pay 
structure, not the carrying forward of a past act of discrimination. 107 
Thus, the Court held that Ledbetter's claim failed because she produced 
no evidence that Goodyear adopted the performance-based pay system 
with the intent to discriminate on the basis of sex and that it was applied 
to her in a discriminatory manner within the statutory filing period. 108 
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
Justice Ginsburg's dissenting oplmon, which Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer joined, explained that pay claims are more "akin to 
hostile environment claims because they may be viewed as the 
cumulative effect of individual acts" and should therefore be treated 
differently from other types of workplace discrimination. I09 The dissent 
analogized Ledbetter's discriminatory pay claim to the hostile work 
environment claim in Morgan. 110 The dissent noted that the entire scope 
of a discriminatory pay claim, including behavior that occurred outside 
the limitations period, should be timely for the purposes of assessing 
liability, so long as any act contributing to the discriminatory pay claim 
takes place within the statutory time period. III The majority's holding, it 
argued, ignored the realities of the workplace regarding the hidden nature 
of compensation disparities. 112 The dissent pointed out that the 
discrimination of which Ledbetter complained is not long past, noting 
that the jury found that Goodyear continued to treat Ledbetter differently 
because of her gender during each pay period, resulting in cumulative 
105 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2172. 
106 Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986). 
107 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2173. 
108 ld. at 2174 (holding that because Ledbetter did not file timely EEOC charges relating to 
her employer's discriminatory pay decisions in the past, she could not maintain a suit based on that 
past discrimination at the present time). The Court matter-of-factly stated that "all Ledbetter has 
alleged is that Goodyear's agents discriminated against her individually in the past and that this 
discrimination reduced the amount oflater paychecks." Id. 
109 Id. at 2180-88. 
110 Id. at 2181; see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 
(2002). 
III Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
112 1d. at 2181-82 (stating that the record shows that Goodyear kept salaries confidential; 
employees had only limited access to information regarding their colleagues' earnings). 
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harm. 113 The dissent sought to refute the majority's assertion that 
allowing employees to challenge discrimination "that extend[s] over long 
periods of time" into the charge-filing period would leave the employer 
defenseless against prejudicial delay.114 It cited defenses available to 
employers such as estoppel, which would prevent an employee from 
bringing a stale claim, thus serving the intent of Title VII to rectify 
workplace discrimination, without nullifying the purpose of the filing 
provision to provide timely notice to employers.115 Finally, the dissent 
argued that under the Court's decision, the discrimination Ledbetter had 
proven is no longer rectifiable under Title VII.116 Thus, the effect of the 
majority decision is that an employer's act of knowingly carrying past 
pay discrimination forward must be treated as lawful conduct that will 
remain unchallenged by employees. 117 
m. PAY DISCRIMINATION: THE NATURE OF PAY DISPARITY CLAIMS 
The Supreme Court in Ledbetter treated a Title VII claim for 
disparate pay as based on a discrete act of discrimination which occurred 
at the time of the pay-setting decision. Yet, there are significant 
differences between pay-setting decisions and traditional discrete acts of 
employment discrimination. Since the nature of the act of discrimination 
ultimately determines whether or not a complainant's claim is timely and 
therefore actionable, it is essential that discriminatory pay claims are 
realistically evaluated and properly characterized. 
A. DISCRIMINATORY PAY: DISCRETE ACT OR INHERENTLY 
UNDISCOVERABLE? 
The Morgan court characterized discrete acts, such as denial of 
training, termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to 
hire as easy to identify. liS As the Ledbetter dissent noted, pay disparities 
and discrete employment actions differ greatly from one another. 119 Two 
of the cases cited by the Ledbetter majority, Evans and Ricks, both 
involved a "single, immediately identifiable act of discrimination:" a 
113 1d. at 2185-86. 
114 1d. 
115 1d. Estoppel is a bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what 
one has said or done before or what has been legally established as true. BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 470 (Abridged 8th ed. 2005). 
116 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2187 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
117 Id. at 2188. 
118 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. lOl, 114 (2002). 
119 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2182. 
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constructive discharge and a denial of tenure. l20 Thus, neither case 
focused on a recurnng or cumulative discriminatory employment 
practice. 121 
The Court ruled in Evans that a continuing violation required some 
present violation beyond mere continuing effect on a plaintiff of past 
discrimination. 122 In Evans, no present violation existed because Evans 
had failed to file a timely charge for discrimination within ninety days of 
her termination,123 and although there was a "continuing impact on her 
pay and fringe benefits," there was no present violation. 124 The Court 
noted that Evans did not have any more of a right to be rehired than any 
other similarly situated applicant; therefore, she was treated equally to 
other applicants. 125 Accordingly, by refusing to credit Evans with 
seniority she had formerly earned and by continuing to adhere to the 
nondiscriminatory seniority policy, United did not violate Title VII. 126 
Similarly, in Ricks, the Court stated that the "mere continuity of 
employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause 
of action for employment discrimination.,,127 Thus, in order for the 
statutory filing period to have commenced at the time of the discharge of 
the plaintiff in Ricks, instead of the time of the denial of tenure, he 
"should have identified the alleged discriminatory acts that continued 
until, or occurred at the time of, the actual termination of his 
employment." 128 
Ledbetter, however, involved more than mere continuity of 
120 ld. at 2167-70. In Evans, the single identifiable act was a constructive discharge. See 
United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 554 (1977). In Ricks, it was a denial of tenure. 
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 252 (1980). In each case, a claim was filed a 
significant amount of time after the occurrence of the discrete discriminatory act. Evans failed to 
file a charge until four years after she was forced to resign because of United's discriminatory policy 
barring married female flight attendants. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2182 (citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 
554-57). Ricks did not object to the denial of tenure until a year later when his contract actually 
ended. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 253-54, 257-58. 
121 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2182; see also Evans, 431 U.S. at 557-58; Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258. 
122 Evans, 431 U.S. at 558. 
l23 ld. at 557. The applicable time limit in February 1972 was 90 days; effective March 24, 
1972, this time was extended to 180 days. Section 706(d), 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(d), then provided in 
part: "A charge under subsection (a) shall be filed within ninety days after the alleged unlawful 
employment practice occurred .... " The 1972 amendments to Title VII added a new subsection (a) 
to § 706. Subsection (d) was redesignated as subsection (e) and it was amended to enlarge the 
limitations period to 180 days. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(e) (West law 2008); P.L. 92-261 §4(a), 86 
Stat. 103 (1972),. 
124 Evans, 431 U.S. at 553, 557-58. 
125 ld. at 559. 
l26 ld. 
127 Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,257 (1980). 
128 ld. at 257. 
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employment. There was evidence of ongoing discriminatory pay 
decisions and disproportionately low pay that continued throughout 
Ledbetter's employment with Goodyear. 129 Since each paycheck 
reflected the discriminatory pay in Ledbetter, a present violation existed 
within the continuous pattern of disparate pay. In holding that 
Ledbetter's claim failed because she produced no evidence that 
Goodyear adopted the performance-based pay system with the intent to 
discriminate, the majority failed to adequately consider the intentional, 
ongoing payment of discriminatorily low paychecks to Ledbetter. The 
economic harm to Ledbetter was not completed in one day, by a single 
act. Instead, the continuous intentional act of discrimination by issuing 
paychecks that delivered a disparate wage because of unlawful 
discrimination compounded to establish a total quantifiable economic 
harm. 
Pay disparities, like that which Ledbetter experienced, operate more 
like a hostile work environment than a discrete incident of 
discrimination. As the Court in Morgan explained, a discrete 
discriminatory act '''occurred' on the day that it 'happened.',,13o Yet, 
discriminatory pay is unlike the easily identifiable occurrences of 
discrimination in the workplace such as termination or denial of transfer. 
When an employer acts openly by terminating an employee, the 
employee has an opportunity to ask why she was terminated and 
determine whether the employer acted based on a legitimate business 
reason or if discrimination played a part. Disparities in pay, however, 
are often concealed and therefore, a discriminatory pay claim should not 
be based solely on the pay-decision. 131 Acts that underlie the 
claim-payment of inequitable paychecks-are part of the same 
unlawful employment practice.132 Thus, as long as one paycheck falls 
within the time period, a claim for disparate pay should not be barred 
under Title VII. 
129 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 2005)) 
(Lilly Ledbetter worked at the Goodyear Tire and Rubber plant in Gadsden, Alabama, from 1979 
until her retirement in 1998. She worked as an area manager, a position typically occupied by men. 
At first, Ledbetter's salary was in line with the salaries of men perfonning substantially similar work 
but over time her pay dropped in comparison to the pay of male area managers with equal or less 
seniority. "By the end of 1997, Ledbetter was the only woman working as an area manager and the 
pay discrepancy between Ledbetter and her 15 male counterparts was stark: Ledbetter was paid 
$3,727 per month; the lowest paid male area manager received $4,286 per month, the highest paid, 
$5,236."). 
130 Nat' I R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,110 (2002). 
131 See infra notes 141-163 and accompanying text. 
132 
Morgan, 536 u.s. at 122. 
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B. THE PREVALENCE OF PAY SECRECY 
Ledbetter, and the practical problems it has created, stem from the 
inability of employees to become aware that they are receiving disparate 
pay. The nature of discrimination in the workplace has changed since 
the implementation of the eRA of 1964.133 In the 1960's through the 
1980's employment discrimination was more likely to be overt. 134 Today, 
discrimination in the workplace operates less as company policy or an 
easily identifiable decision to discriminate, and more as a persistent and 
underlying hindrance to equal opportunity and advancement. 135 The key 
reason pay disparity claims differ from claims based on discrete acts, 
such as termination or refusal to hire, is that compensation disparities are 
often hidden. 136 Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in Ledbetter noted 
that 
When an employer makes a decision of such open and definitive 
character, an employee can immediately seek out an explanation and 
evaluate it for pretext. Compensation disparities, in contrast, are often 
hidden from sight. It is not unusual ... for management to decline to 
publish employee pay levels, or for employees to keep private their 
I · 13'7 own sa anes. 
The Ledbetter decision ignores the reality that pay discrimination is 
difficult to detect. Employees often have no access to company-wide 
salary data or any other information that would be necessary to raise a 
suspicion of discriminatory pay.138 Unlike termination or denial of 
promotion decisions, when an individual immediately knows that she has 
suffered an adverse employment action, an employee may not know that 
a pay decision of which she is aware of is, in fact, adverse. 139 For 
instance, a discriminatory pay gap may not begin with a change in a 
133 See generally Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a 
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 91 (2003). 
134 ld. 
135/d. 
136 See Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1008-1009 (10th Cir. 2002). 
137 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2181 (2007) (Ginsburg, J .• 
dissenting); see, e.g .. Goodwin, 275 F.3d atl008-09 (plaintiff did not know what her colleagues 
earned until a printout listing salaries appeared on her desk, seven years after her starting salary was 
set lower than her co-workers' salaries); McMillan v. Mass. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 1998) (plaintiff worked for employer for years before learning 
of salary disparity published in a newspaper). 
138 See generally Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, "Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No 
Way": Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167 (2004). 
139 1d. 
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female employee's pay, but instead with a decision only to increase the 
pay of male colleagues. 14O Therefore, a pay-setting decision, unless it 
implements a pay cut, is unlikely to be viewed as discrimination at the 
. h' 141 hme t at It occurs. 
Discussion by individuals of their salaries violates an American 
social norm. 142 One-third of United States private-sector employers have 
adopted specific rules prohibiting employees from discussing their wages 
with co-workers, rules known as pay secrecy/confidentiality rules. 143 A 
significant number of employers have more informal expectations that 
employees "keep their lips sealed about their salaries."I44 
A recent study of employment practices in the United States and 
Canada found pay secrecy to be a significant concern in many 
organizations. 145 The knowledge of differences in wages among 
employees may strain relationships among employees and negatively 
impact individual satisfaction and office unity.l46 For many individual 
employees, their rate of pay is a very private matter. 147 Employees do 
not want their employers disclosing their rate of pay, nor do they want 
co-workers asking them how much they make. 148 
The reasons behind the very private nature of employees vary. 
Some individuals do not want payor related information revealed 
because they think it might lead others to think less of them, while others 
are concerned that the disclosure of their pay may compromise the 
advantageous work arrangement they have with their employer. 149 
Others may be more reluctant to show off one's wealth and success. 150 
Some employees may be motivated to keep their salaries secret to avoid 
140 The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007: Hearing Before the House Education and Labor 
Committee, I 10th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (written testimony of Deborah Brake, Law Professor at the 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, at 5). 
141 [d. For example, an employee who learns that she is about to receive a four-percent raise 
would have no reason to suspect pay discrimination when she does not know about the raises her 
colleagues earned. 
142 Bierman & Gely, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. at 168. 
143 [d. at 168; see also The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007: Hearing before the House 
Education and Labor Committee, I 10th Con g., 1st Sess. (2007) (written testimony of Wade 
Henderson, President and CEO of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, at 3). 
144 Bierman & Gely, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. at 168. 
145 [d. at 171. 
146 See generally Robert L. Opsahl, Managerial Compensation: Needed Research, 2 ORG. 
BEHA V. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 208 (1967) (discussing negative effects of open pay systems). 
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conflict with other co-workers. 151 Professors Danziger and Katz suggest 
that labor mobility is facilitated by employees revealing to co-workers 
their salary as well as other job offers they have received. 152 For that 
reason, employers who impose pay secrecy/confidentiality rules may do 
so to maintain the status quo. 
Salary confidentiality policies run contrary to the purpose of the 
National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter NLRA), which protects the 
rights of all employees, whether represented by a union or not, to engage 
in "concerted activity for the purpose of ... mutual aid or protection." 153 
The federal courts and the National Labor Relations Board have held that 
discussion of wages is protected concerted activity under section 7 of the 
NLRA. 154 Furthermore, some states have enacted statutes to protect 
employee discussions of their wages. 155 Unfortunately, without 
awareness or notification of such rights, it remains extremely difficult for 
employees to discover that they have been subject to discriminatory pay. 
C. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF DISPARATE PAY 
Discriminatory pay decisions are not separate and distinct from 
the paychecks that follow them. 156 One rationale behind treating 
employment practice claims differently from discrete act claims under 
Title VII is that a series of separate acts collectively constitute one 
151 See Gerald S. Leventhal, The Distribution of Rewards and Resources in Groups and 
Organizations, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 92 (Leonard Berkowitz & 
Elaine Walster eds., 1976); Gerald S. Leventhal, et ai., BEYOND FAIRNESS: A THEORY OF 
ALLOCATION PREFERENCES, IN JUSTICE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 167 (Gerald Mikula ed., 1980). 
152 See Leif Danziger & Eliakim Katz, Wage Secrecy as a Social Convention, 35 ECON. 
INQUIRY 59, 60-69 (1997). 
153 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (Westlaw 2008). 
154 See, e.g., NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Ctr., 218 F. 3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding 
employer's oral, unauthorized, and unenforced rule prohibiting employees from discussing wages 
constituted unfair labor practice); Fredericksburg Glass & Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 173-74, 
179 (1997) (finding protected concerted activity when employees discussed whether they were being 
paid wage rates required by law). 
155 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 232 (Westlaw current with urgency legislation through Ch. 12 of 
2008 Reg.Sess. and Ch. 6 of 2007-2008 Third EX.Sess., and Props. 98 and 99). California Labor 
Code section 232 prohibits employers from requiring that employees refrain from discussing the 
amount they are paid and prohibits employers from disciplining employees who discuss their wages 
with other employees. [d. Michigan and Vermont have enacted similar statutes protecting 
discussions concerning wages among employees. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 408.483a 
(Westlaw through P.A.2008, No. 105 of the 2008 Regular Session, 94th Legislature); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Westlaw through No. 83 of the Adjourned Session of the 2007-2008 session of 
the General Assembly). 
156 The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007: Hearing Before the House Education and Labor 
Committee, II Oth Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (written testimony of Deborah Brake, Law Professor at the 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, at I). 
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"unlawful employment practice." 157 Essentially, the substantial 
collective effect of individual acts amounts to discrimination. 158 Claims 
of pay disparity, such as Ledbetter's, rest not on one particular paycheck, 
but on the "cumulative effect of individual acts.,,159 
In a pay disparity claim, it is not only the pay decision but the 
cumulatively lower income over a person's career that amounts to 
discriminatory harm that is impermissible under Title VII. Each pay 
decision builds on the prior one, and unless corrected, discriminatory pay 
decisions can be magnified by subsequent percentage-based 
adjustments. l60 Under Ledbetter, the very cases where harm of the most 
egregious variety occurs, over the course of an individual's career, are 
the cases that are not actionable. 
In Ledbetter, the plaintiff was the only woman working as an area 
manager, and the discrepancy between her pay and that of her fifteen 
male counterparts was severe; Ledbetter was being paid approximately 
twenty percent less than the lowest paid male area manager and almost 
forty percent less than the highest paid male. 161 When a woman is paid 
less than a similarly situated man, the employer reduces its costs each 
time the pay differential is implemented. 162 Thus, the employer gains a 
windfall from a discriminatory pay decision as long as the discrimination 
goes undetected for 180 days, after which the premium only increases 
over time. This cumulative characteristic distinguishes pay claims from 
discrete employment actions. 163 
As in Morgan, the discriminatory acts in Ledbetter-the issuance of 
discriminatory paychecks-fell outside the period to file a charge with 
the EEOC, yet with each new paycheck, Goodyear contributed 
incrementally to the harm. 164 Each paycheck that amounted to less than 
Ledbetter would have received if her employer adhered to a 
nondiscriminatory compensation regime should have been treated as a 
157 See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. WI, 117 (2002); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(e)(I). 
158 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. 
159 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2181 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
160 The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of2007: Hearing Before the House Education and Labor 
Committee, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (written testimony of Deborah Brake, Law Professor at the 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, at 2). 
161 1d. Ledbetter was paid $3,727 per month; the lowest paid male area manager received 
$4,286 per month, and the highest paid male received $5,236. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2178 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
162 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
163 1d. 
164 See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002); see also Bazemore 
v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986). 
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cognizable harm because it was the type of harm that Title VII was 
designed to rectify. 165 Each paycheck within the filing period 
compounded the discrimination Ledbetter encountered and thus 
contributed to the "actionable wrong" or the succession of acts 
constituting a pattern of discriminatory pay. 166 
IV. THE IMPACf OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN LEDBE1TER 
Ledbetter has changed the understanding of when discrimination 
occurs and when a plaintiff may file a claim based on such 
discrimination. It conflicts with current administrative guidance issued 
by the EEOC. 167 Furthermore, the decision fails to consider workplace 
realities and effectually creates a catch-22 for employees who may be 
suffering pay discrimination. If an employee does not file a charge 
within the limited filing period from the time of the discriminatory pay 
decision, she loses the right to challenge it. But if an employee files a 
charge too soon, she will most likely be unable to establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination under Title VII. Thus, the Ledbetter decision 
effectively weakens the statutory protections against discrimination in 
compensation. 
A. CONTRADICTION WITH THE EEOC GUIDANCE 
The EEOC's Compliance Manual currently reflects the pre-
Ledbetter rule on pay discrimination. Its latest revision following 
Morgan explained: 
In ... Morgan, the Supreme Court ruled that the timeliness of a charge 
depends upon whether it involves a discrete act or a hostile work 
environment claim .... A discrete act, such as the failure to hire or 
promote, termination, or denial of transfer, is independently actionable 
if it is the subject of a timely charge. Such acts must be challenged 
within 180/300 days of the date that the charging party received 
unequivocal written or oral notification of the action, regardless of the 
action's effective date .... Repeated occurrences of the same 
discriminatory employment action, such as discriminatory paychecks, 
165 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111-12; see also Forsyth v. Fed'n Employment & Guidance 
Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2005). 
166 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
167 See infra notes 176-183 and accompanying text. 
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can be challenged as lonr as one discriminatory act occurred within the charge filing period. 16 
Ledbetter runs counter to the prevailing understanding articulated in the 
EEOC Compliance Manual excerpt, which shows a more realistic view 
of the nature of pay discrimination. The EEOC's application of Title VII 
to disparate pay claims permits an employee to challenge continuing pay 
disparity as long as one paycheck that pays the employee less because of 
discrimination falls within the limitations period. 169 The EEOC 
Compliance Manual provides that certain serial and systemic violations 
constitute continuing violations and allows relief for "repeated 
occurrences of the same discriminatory employment action, such as 
discriminatory paychecks, [that] can be challenged as long as one 
discriminatory act occurred within the charge filing period.,,170 In 
Ledbetter, the Court declined to give any consideration to agency 
guidance and dismissed the EEOC's interpretation as unworthy of any 
deference. 171 
While the Court is not required to defer to the EEOC, the agency 
guidance plays a critical role in providing uniform direction to those who 
seek administrative relief for employment discrimination. The EEOC's 
168 EEOC Compliance Manual, § 2-IV-C, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-
IV -C (last visited April II, 2008). 
169 EEOC Compliance Manual, § 2-IV -C(1 )(a), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ docs/threshold. 
html#2-IV-C-I-a (last visited April II, 2008); see also Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2185 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (citing EEOC administrative rulings and litigation positions permitting employees to 
challenge any discriminatory paychecks received within the limitations period). 
170 EEOC Compliance Manual, § 2-IV-C, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-
IV-C (last visited April II, 2008) (emphasis added). The EEOC Compliance Manual provides 
guidance to employers and attorneys on equal employment opportunity requirements and policy 
implementation for laws enforced by the EEOC pursuant to the requirements defined in Executive 
Order 12866, as amended by Executive Order 13422, and as interpreted in the Office of 
Management and Budget's Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices (Final Bulletin), 72 
F. R. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007). 
171 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2177; see Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 u.s. 101, 
III n.6 (2002) (declining to extend Chevron deference to the EEOC Compliance Manual). The 
Ledbetter Court noted that the EEOC's views are based on its misreading of Bazemore. See, e.g., 
Amft v. Mineta, No. 07A40116, 2006 WL 985183, (EEOC Office of Fed. Operations, Apr. 6, 2006); 
Albritton v. Postmaster General, No. 01A44063, 2004 WL 2983682 (EEOC Office of Fed. 
Operations, Dec. 17, 2004). The Supreme Court reiterated its outlook of past opinions that 
"agencies have no special claim to deference in their interpretation of our decisions." See Reno v. 
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) (giving the United States Justice Department no 
deference concerning the implication of a prior Supreme Court case holding that the term "effect" in 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was limited to retrogressive effects). The Supreme Court has held 
that the EEOC's interpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron deference. See EEOC v. Arabian 
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991). However, interpretations of the EEOC are "entitled to 
respect" to the extent that those interpretations have the "power to persuade." See Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,587 (2000). 
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interpretation of Title VII, unlike the varied interpretations by the courts, 
provides meaning to the ambiguous statute which complainants look to 
when determining whether or not they have suffered actionable 
workplace discrimination. 172 The EEOC guidance represents an 
interpretation of the law by the government entity with the greatest 
expertise and interest in determining the meaning of the statute. The 
expertise of the EEOC in the area of employment discrimination is 
unparalleled by the courts. 173 Congress granted enforcement powers to 
the EEOC under Title VII, thereby requiring the agency to investigate 
and conciliate claims, with the intent that administrative resolution would 
eliminate the need for judicial action. 174 To effectively conciliate claims 
of employment discrimination the EEOC must interpret the meaning of 
the statute, yet without deference to those interpretations, the value of the 
conciliation process is significantly minimized until the courts make their 
own determination as to the statutory meaning. 175 This runs contrary to 
the purpose of the EEOC's role in informal resolution of employment 
discrimination claims. 
B. PAY DISCRIMINATION EXEMPT FROM CHALLENGE 
The Ledbetter Court focused on the timeliness provision of Title VII 
as a protection for the defendant employer against stale claims. 
Consequently, Ledbetter dramatically weakens the provisions of Title 
172 See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 549, 595 (1985) (arguing courts should grant deference to the EEOC even though the EEOC 
lacks specific rulemaking authority). 
173 See Theodore W. Wem, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights 
Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1533, 1535 
(1999) (arguing that the EEOC's interpretations of Title VII have not received their fair share of 
judicial deference); see H.R. REP. No. 92-238 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.A.A.N. 2137, 2146 
("Administrative tribunals are better equipped to handle the complicated issues involved in 
employment discrimination cases."). 
174 See supra notes 18-39 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent and 
purpose in establishing the EEOC); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77-78 (1984) ("Congress 
did not abandon its wish that violations of the statute could be remedied without resort to the courts, 
as is evidenced by its retention in 1972 of the requirement that the Commission, before filing suit, 
attempt to resolve disputes through conciliation."); see also Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the 
Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in 
Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 96 (1995). 
175 Id.: see also Jennifer M. Follette, Comment, Complete Justice: Upholding the Principles of 
Title VII Through Appropriate Treatment of After-Acquired Evidence, 68 WASH. L. REV. 651, 667 
(1993) ("If the courts do not defer to reasonable guidelines created by the EEOC, they frustrate the 
primary purpose for the Commission's existence .... Moreover, deference to the guidelines will 
encourage parties to settle claims before they reach litigation, thus promoting the EEOC's goal of 
conciliation."). 
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VII intended to combat discriminatory employment practices. 176 The 
Supreme Court has stated that Title VII's prohibitions were intended to 
be "broadly inclusive, proscribing not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.,,177 The 
Ledbetter holding that only the original discriminatory pay decision 
triggers the EEOC filing period leaves the employer insulated from 
liability after the initial statutory filing period passes, even though the 
discriminatory harm continues and aggregates. 178 Thus, if an employee 
fails to file a charge of discrimination within 180 days of the 
discriminatory pay decision, Ledbetter effectively immunizes 
discriminatory pay from challenge, permitting the employer to continue 
to pay the employee in a discriminatory fashion for the rest of her 
employment. 
C. THE IMPACT OF LEDBEITER ON LITIGATION OF DISCRINIINATORY PAY 
CLAIMS 
The Ledbetter decision creates a catch-22 scenario for employees. 179 
If an employee does not file a charge within 180 days of a discriminatory 
pay decision, she loses the right to challenge it. But if the employee 
complains to an employer too soon-that is, without adequate factual 
and legal foundation-she can be terminated and left unable to 
demonstrate a prima facie case under Title VII. 180 Thus, the narrow 
window in which to file may result in an employee not having adequate 
time to explore and investigate or even become aware of what would 
otherwise have been a valid claim. 181 By the time the discrimination 
becomes clearly identifiable, under Ledbetter, the victim of pay 
discrimination would find her Title VII claims foreclosed. 182 
176 H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 2 (2007). 
177 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
178 The Ully Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of2007: Hearing Before the House Education and Labor 
Committee, I 10th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (written testimony of Deborah Brake, Law Professor at the 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, at 4). 
179 1d. 
ISO Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2182; see also Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 
268 (2001) (single incident of allegedly lewd joking held inadequate to support a claim of sexual 
harassment violating Title VII of Civil Rights Act.). 
181 See H.R. Rep. No. 110-237 at 13 (2007). 
182 See The Ully Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007: Hearing Before the House Education and 
Labor Committee, 1l0th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (written testimony of Deborah Brake, Law 
Professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, at 2); see also LINDA BABCOCK & SARA 
LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATIONS AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (Princeton University 
Press, 2003) (demonstrating how a discriminatory pay decision can continue to produce an 
increasing pay disparity throughout an individual's career). 
28
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol38/iss2/3
2008] TITLE VII LIMITATION PERIOD 277 
The Ledbetter decision encourages more charges and litigation, 
running counter to the Title VII statutory preference for informal 
resolution of claims through administrative remedy.183 Under Ledbetter, 
an employee must file a charge within 180 days of each pay decision, in 
order to preserve her rights to challenge discrimination. '84 The court's 
narrow construction of what constitutes a discriminatory act in a 
disparate pay claim forces an employee to act by filing a claim with the 
EEOC when she first suspects discrimination, despite the fact that the 
law tries to encourage informal conciliation between employer and 
employee to avoid conflict and litigation. 185 Thus, an employee may be 
forced to skip the process of asking questions, gathering information, and 
attempting to resolve the matter informally with the employer. The 
result benefits neither employers nor employees. 186 Not only does the 
decision encourage more EEOC claims, it also undermines congressional 
intent to encourage informal conciliation between the employer and 
employee. 187 
While Ledbetter may increase the number of charges filed with the 
EEOC, it may also lead to an overall decrease in the number of 
legitimate claims. In testimony to Congress, Wade Henderson, President 
and Chief Executive Officer of the Leadership Conference on Civil 
Rights, pointed out that because it will become more difficult for 
employees to bring Title VII pay discrimination claims, countless 
meritorious claims will never be adjudicated as they are found to be 
time-barred. 188 Thus, the decision in Ledbetter will act as a significant 
183 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Westlaw 2008). 
184 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165. 
185 See H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 14 (2007). EEOC is statutorily required to attempt to 
resolve findings of discrimination through "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 
persuasion." See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (Westlaw 2008). 
186 After the EEOC investigation finds "reasonable cause" to believe that discrimination has 
occurred, the parties will be invited to participate in conciliation discussions in which EEOC 
investigators work with the parties to develop an appropriate remedy for the discrimination. 
Conciliation is a voluntary negotiation process that allows employers and employees to present 
counter-offers and remove the uncertainty, cost, and animosity surrounding litigation. U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Investigations-What an Employer Should Know, How 
Does a Charge Get Resolved, Conciliation, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/employerslinvestigations.html#conciliation (last visited April 16,2008); See 
also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (Westlaw 2008). 
187 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (Westlaw 2008). 
188 The Ully Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of2007: Hearing Before the House Education and Labor 
Committee, I 10th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (written testimony of Wade Henderson, President and 
CEO of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, at 6). The Leadership Conference on Civil 
Rights (LCCR) was founded in 1950 by three leaders of the civil rights movement: A. Philip 
Randolph, founder of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of 
the NAACP; and Arnold Aronson, a leader of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory 
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deterrent for those that may actually be aware of discrimination but 
simply do not believe there has been enough time to establish a 
sufficiently significant harm to justify raising a complaint. As Justice 
Ginsburg stated in the Ledbetter dissent, "even if an employee suspects 
that the reason for a comparatively low raise is not performance but sex 
or some other protected class, the amount involved may seem too small, 
or the employer's intent too ambiguous, to make the issue immediately 
actionable-or winnable.,,189 While an employee may be motivated to 
complain to her employer at the first sign of a pay gap, she may lack an 
adequate foundation for a reasonable belief that the gap is because of 
gender discrimination, and thus, under Ledbetter, after only 180 days, an 
otherwise legitimate claim of discrimination will have no remedy under 
Title VII. 190 One of the most troubling aspects of Ledbetter is the absurd 
disconnect between the majority's narrow construction of the running of 
the filing requirement at the time of a pay decision and the statutory 
requirement for a reasonable belief that a discriminatory act has occurred 
before a person may file a claim of pay discrimination. 
Ledbetter directly conflicts with workplace realities and creates 
confusion as to when discrimination occurs and becomes actionable. 
The Ledbetter rule for filing a Title VII disparate pay claim forces 
employees to either bring pay claims prematurely when there is 
insufficient evidence that there has been unlawful pay discrimination or 
wait until a later time when more substantial evidence exists and risk 
being barred from bringing such claims by the statute of limitations. 
V. SOLUTIONS: THE APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE TO TITLE 
VII CLAIMS AND A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
The purpose of statutes of limitations is to provide defendants with 
prompt notice of claims and prevent plaintiffs from raising old claims. 191 
The Supreme Court has held that, while statutes of limitations serve to 
protect defendants from the burden of defending stale claims, this 
interest may be outweighed "where the interests of justice require 
vindication of the plaintiff's rights.,,192 Consistent with this holding, 
Council. The LCCR has coordinated national legislative campaigns on behalf of major civil rights 
laws since 1957. Civilrights.org, About LCCR and LCCREF, http://www.civilrights.orglabout/#lccr 
(last visited Apr. 18, , 2008). 
189 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
190 H. Rep. No. 110-237 (2007); see Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 
270 (2001) (discussing inadequacy of a reasonable belief that a single lewd remark violated Title 
VII's standards for sexual harassment). 
191 See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,428 (1965). 
192 1d. (finding a plaintiff should not be deprived rights when no policy underlying a statute of 
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courts have applied equitable principles to prevent unjust results to 
plaintiffs with legitimate claims. 
The filing requirement of Title VII, like a statute of limitations, is 
intended to provide prompt notice to employers. 193 In the Title VII 
context, the filing provision serves the additional purpose of allowing the 
EEOC to attempt to resolve the dispute through informal means before 
court action is commenced. The charge-filing and suit-filing periods 
under Title VII are also subject to principles of equity.194 The Supreme 
Court has held that the filing period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but 
instead is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling "when equity 
so requires.,,195 Yet, the Supreme Court has given little guidance as to. 
when such doctrines should be applied in Title VII cases. 
Courts will apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to suspend the 
running of a statute of limitations when a defendant has misled a plaintiff 
to conceal the existence of a cause of action. 196 Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court has held that for equitable tolling to apply, a party must 
show more than neglect. 197 Some circuits apply equitable tolling only if 
the defendant's wrongdoing is found to have proximately caused the late 
filing of a claim. 198 Thus, while equitable tolling may be attractive to 
victims of discriminatory pay, courts have imposed limitations that 
limitations is served). 
193 Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants. Such 
statutes "promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been 
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on 
notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time 
comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." Burnett, 380 u.s. at 428 (citing Order of R.R. 
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)). 
194 Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (noting statutory time limits 
applicable to lawsuits against private employers under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling). 
195 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002); see also Zipes v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982) (noting equitable doctrines allow courts to honor 
Title VII's remedial purpose "without negating the particular purpose of the filing requirement, to 
give prompt notice to the employer"). 
196 Lurie v. Meserve, 214 F. Supp. 2d 546, 551 (D. Md. 2002) (stating equitable tolling of a 
statute of limitations only applies in limited circumstances, "where the defendant has wrongfully 
deceived or misled the plaintiff') (quoting C.M. English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 
(4th Cir. 1987)). 
197 Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (finding "garden variety" 
neglect cannot support equitable tolling). 
198 Ramirez v. City of San Antonio, 312 F.3d 178, 183-84 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that a court 
will equitably toll a limitations period only when the employer's affirmative acts misled the 
employee); Seay v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 339 F.3d 454, 469-70 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding an 
abuse of discretion in declining to extend equitable tolling to a plaintiff after defendant employer had 
misrepresented the circumstances surrounding the non-selection of plaintiff). 
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constrain its utility.'99 
Another doctrine applicable to Title VII claims of employment 
discrimination is estoppel. Based on the concept of fairness, the doctrine 
of estoppel is intended to prevent a person from benefiting from action or 
inaction he has induced another to take. 2°O Equitable estoppel requires 
misleading conduct by the party to be estopped which caused the other 
party to rely in a way that was detrimental to her legal or economic 
interests.2o, Therefore, an employer's mere silence will not raise 
estoppel in an employment discrimination claim. 202 
While the doctrines of tolling and estoppel may be applicable in a 
Title VII context, their application depends on showing evidence of 
employer wrongdoing. The burden of showing employer misconduct 
may make the application of these doctrines an unlikely remedy for an 
employee who filed an untimely but otherwise legitimate claim of 
employment discrimination. Furthermore, courts have rejected 
application of estoppel defenses in favor of protecting statutory 
interests. 203 
A. A DOOR LEFT OPEN? APPLYING THE DISCOVERY RULE TO TITLE VII 
DISCRIMINATORY PAY CLAIMS 
The common law rule that a cause of action accrues at the time of 
the injury has been modified by the discovery rule. The discovery rule is 
an exception which shields a plaintiff from the accrual of a cause of 
action until she discovers or should have discovered that she may have 
an actionable claim, or until she discovers or should have discovered all 
of the essential elements of the claim. 204 It was developed to rectify the 
199 Courts rarely apply the doctrine of equitable tolling, often stating that it should be reserved 
for extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 
80-81 (2d Cir. 2003) (considering whether the person seeking application of equitable tolling has 
acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled and has proved that 
the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply); Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 
301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that even admissible evidence of threatening retaliatory 
firing if employee sued for sexual harassment under Title VII would not make out a defense of 
equitable estoppel). 
200 Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 436 N.E.2d 1265, 1269-70 (N.Y. 
1982). The doctrine of estoppel is a bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that 
contradicts what one has said or done before or what has been legally established as true. BLACK'S 
LAW DlCfIONARY 470 (Abridged 8th ed. 2005). 
201 Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1265 (Conn. 1994). 
202 See Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing the 
test for estoppel to require misleading conduct). 
203 See Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing availability 
of estoppel as a defense under ERISA when the statute provides a limitation period). 
204 Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Vaught v. R.R. 
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harsh results from the foreclosure of otherwise legitimate plaintiffs from 
seeking recourse because the plaintiff was not aware of the injury within 
the requisite statute of limitations.205 Unlike doctrines of estoppel and 
equitable tolling, the discovery rule does not rely on evidence of 
employer wrongdoing. Instead, the discovery rule applies if an element 
of a cause of action, such as damages, has occurred but cannot be 
pleaded in a complaint because it is not yet discoverable with reasonable 
diligence206 or because the injured party is unable to know of the injury 
because the nature of the injury is inherently undiscoverable. 207 
Thus, application of the discovery rule in Title VII disparate pay 
claims would provide that the filing period begins to run at the time the 
plaintiff discovers the injury. The discovery of the injury means not the 
actual discovery of the reason for the injury, but rather the discovery of 
facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or of facts sufficient to 
put a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that would lead to the 
discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action. 208 Thus, 
in a claim for discriminatory pay, the necessary discovery would be the 
knowledge of the receipt of the discriminatory pay, rather than the 
plaintiffs awareness of the reason for the injury such as the underlying 
racial or gender bias or the pay-setting decision. For example, the 
Seventh Circuit, in Wolfolk v. Rivera, held the time limit was tolled until 
the plaintiff, a black male, discovered that he was being paid less than 
white employees doing the same job.209 The court found that the 
plaintiffs lack of knowledge of facts that supported a discrimination 
claim constituted circumstances beyond his control that prevented him 
from submitting the matter to the defendant's equal employment 
opportunity counselor within the filing period.210 Consistent with the 
Donnelley & Sons Co., 745 F.2d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding it appropriate to toll the statute of 
limitations until a reasonable plaintiff should have known facts that would support a charge of 
discrimination). 
205 Doe v. Maskell, 679 A.2d 1087, 1089-90 (Md. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1093 (1997). 
206 Shields v. Shell Oil Co., 604 N.W. 2d 719 (Mich. App. 1999). 
2(f1 Geo. Knight & Co., Inc. v. Watson Wyatt & Co., 170 F. 3d 210, 216 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(finding appellant knew or reasonably should have ascertained the underfunded status of retirement 
plan); AT&T Corp. v. Rylander, 2 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. App. 1999) (cause of action for discrimination 
was not inherently undiscoverable because it was based on the Comptroller's failure to provide 
information that was publicly available). 
208 Union School Dist. No. 20 v. Lench, 134 Vt. 424, 428 (1976). 
209 Wolfolk v. Rivera, 729 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 
F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1983) (l80-day period began running on the day plaintiff's employer told him his 
job was terminated because of his age and ill health); see also Tucker v. United Parcel Serv., 657 
F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1981) (time limit began running on date black employees learned that white 
seasonal employees were being recalled and blacks were not). 
210 Wolfolk, 729 F.2d at 1118. 
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equitable nature of the discovery rule, the court allowed the 
complainant's claim, striking a balance between fairness to the 
complainant and the importance of initiating the prompt investigation of 
a claim.2Il 
The Supreme Court has discussed the application of the principle in 
discrimination claims under Title VII but has yet to apply the rule. 212 
Morgan noted that there may be circumstances where it will be difficult 
to determine when the time period should begin to run, and one issue that 
may arise in such circumstances is whether the time begins to run when 
the injury occurs as opposed to when the injury reasonably should have 
been discovered. 213 In Ledbetter, the Court explicitly stated it would not 
consider whether the discovery rule should be applied,z14 The Court 
noted that because the rule was not argued by Ledbetter, the court had 
"no occasion to address the issue.,,215 This leaves the door open for Title 
VII plaintiffs to argue that the discovery rule applies to toll the 
administrative filing period upon the plaintiff s discovery of the disparate 
pay. The Supreme Court has not foreclosed the application of the 
discovery rule; therefore it may be one way for courts to curb the 
limiting effects of Ledbetter in Title VII discriminatory pay cases.216 
However, it may also create uncertainties for plaintiffs. Since the 
discovery rule is applied at the discretion of the court there will be great 
variance among courts as to whether equity requires its application. 
Courts may differ on determinations of what a plaintiff should have 
known and when the plaintiff should have known it. Ultimately, the 
discovery rule is not a reliable remedy because of the discretionary 
nature of its application. 
211 Id. 
212 Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 262 n.16 (1980) (recognizing that the 
limitations periods should not begin to run so soon that it is too difficult for a plaintiff to utilize 
protections under the civil rights statutes); see also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750,761 
(1979); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522,526-527 (1972). 
213 Nat' I R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 n.7 (2002). 
214 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2187 n.IO (2007) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (stating that the Court has previously declined to address whether Title VII suits are 
subject to the discovery rule in Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, n. 7 
(2002)); see also Peter E. Leckman, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.: Discovery Rule May 
Limit Impact of Supreme Court's Title VII Decision, BENDER'S CALIFORNIA LABOR & 
EMPLOYMENT BULLETIN, July 2007, at 181, 183. 
215 Ledbeller, 127 S. Ct. at 2177. 
216 Leckman, 'BENDER'S CALIFORNIA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT BULLETIN, July 2007, at 181; 
see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Deals a Blow 10 Pay Discrimination Plaintiffs, 43 JTLA 
Trial 60 (Sept. 2007). 
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B. A LEGISLATIVE REMEDY: CONGRESS RESPONDED TO THE 
WEAKENING OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS FOR 
EMPLOYEES WITH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 
283 
Congress has previously amended the CRA of 1964 to strengthen 
and improve federal civil rights laws, finding legislation necessary to 
provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination in 
employment. 217 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 largely in 
response to five employment discrimination cases that greatly weakened 
the scope and effectiveness of federal civil rights protections for 
employees.2I8 Congress found that additional remedies under federal law 
were needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination 
in the workplace. 219 
The Ledbetter majority relied on one of the five controversial 
decisions leading up to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Lorance v. AT&T 
Technologies, which involved the application of a discriminatory 
seniority system.220 Lorance and its aftermath illustrates how Congress 
has stepped in to remedy inequity created by the Supreme Court's Title 
VII jurisprudence. In Lorance, an employer and the union representing 
its employees modified the manner in which seniority was measured for 
one specific job classification, from years of service with the employer 
generally to years of service in the specific job classification.221 When 
female employees in that specific job were laid off due to their low 
seniority, they filed a charge with the EEOC.222 The plaintiffs alleged 
that, had seniority continued to be measured as years of service with the 
employer, they would not have been laid off.223 They also alleged that 
the seniority scheme had been adopted with discriminatory intent to 
protect incumbent male employees when women with substantial plant 
21742 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (Westlaw 2008). 
218 See Pub. L. No. \02-166, §§ 2-3, \OS Stat. 1071 (1991) (finding further legislation is 
necessary to protect against unlawful workplace discrimination). 
219 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
220 See Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2-3, lOS Stat. \071 (1991); see also Lorance v. AT&T 
Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilkes, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (expanding after-the-fact 
challenges to affirmative action plans); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) 
(making it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in disparate impact claims); Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (limiting liability for intentional discrimination in "mixed motive" 
cases); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that an employee could not 
sue for damages caused by racial harassment on the job, because even if the employer's conduct was 
discriminatory, the employer had not denied the employee the same right to make and enforce 
contracts that is enjoyed by white citizens). 
221 Lorance v. AT&T Techs., 490 U.S. 900, 902-03 (1989). 
222 Lorance, 490 U.S. at 902. 
223 [d. at 902-03. 
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seniority began to move into the traditionally male positions. 224 
However, the Court held that the claim was untimely, noting that the new 
seniority system did not, on its face, treat men and women differently 
and that the plaintiffs did not allege that it had been applied in a 
discriminatory manner.225 Thus, the Court concluded that the limitations 
period ran from the date of the signing of the underlying agreement, not 
from the date when the effects of the new system were manifested 
because the "invalidity of the facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally 
applied ... seniority system is wholly dependent on the alleged illegality 
of signing the underlying agreement.,,226 
In response to the Court's ruling, Congress amended Title VII with 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, providing a legislative 
solution to the problem created by Lorance, the limitation on the right of 
an employee to challenge discriminatory seniority systems.227 Section 
112 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act expanded the ability of employees to 
challenge discriminatory sernonty systems by adding that a 
discriminatory seniority system constitutes an unlawful employment 
practice when such a system is adopted, when a person becomes subject 
to it, or when a person is injured by application of the seniority system or 
a provision of the system.228 Essentially, Congress agreed with the 
dissenters in Lorance that "the harsh reality of [that] decision," was 
"glaringly at odds with the purposes of Title VII.,,229 The difference, of 
course, was that Congress could do something about it by strengthening 
statutory authority. 
The majority in Ledbetter narrowly interpreted the statute's 
applicability: 
For present purposes, what is most important about the amendment in 
question is that it applied only to the adoption of a discriminatory 
224 Id. 
225 Id. at 910-12. 
226 Id. at 911 ; see also Stephen A. Plass, Privatizing Antidiscrimination Law with Arbitration: 
The Title VII Proof Problem, 68 MONT. L. REV. lSI, 156-57 (2007) (discussing Title VII's loss of 
"pedigree" as evidenced by the Court's decision in Lorance focusing on insulating employers from 
employees' "stale" claims, instead of accommodating employee debility stemming from lack of 
notice). 
22742 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (Westlaw 2008). 
228 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (Westlaw 2008) (allowing for Title VII liability arising 
from an intentionally discriminatory seniority system both at the time of its adoption and at the time 
of its application); see also H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at IS (2007). 
229 See Lorance, 490 U.S. at 914 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 
105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (The 1991 Civil Rights Act was designed "to respond to recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide 
adequate protection to victims of discrimination"). 
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seniority system, not to other types of employment discrimination. 
Evans and Ricks, upon which Lorance relied, and which employed 
'd . al . 1ft· I 230 1 entlc reasomng, were e In pace. 
285 
However, the dissent in Ledbetter noted that the Court's reliance on 
Lorance is misplaced because the decision is no longer effective,231 since 
Congress superseded the Court's holding by passing the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act.232 The Ledbetter dissent also distinguished the majority's 
application of Lorance by noting that Lorance is irrelevant because 
Lorance involved a one-time discrete act-the adoption of the seniority 
system-unlike the ongoing disparate pay present in Ledbetter.233 
While Section 112 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act specifically 
addresses seniority systems, Congress found that the Court had unduly 
contracted the scope of protection afforded by Title VII and other civil 
rights statutes. Congress, therefore, set out to insure that the rule 
established in Bazemore be generalized. 234 The Senate Report 
accompanying the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990,235 which had a 
provision similar to the one in the 1991 Act dealing with seniority 
systems, explained: 
Where, as was alleged in Lorance, an employer adopts a rule or 
decision with an unlawful discriminatory motive, each application of 
that rule or decision is a new violation of the law. In Bazemore the 
Supreme Court properly held that each application ... i.e., each new 
paycheck, constituted a distinct violation of Title VII. Section 7(a)(2) 
generalizes the result correctly reached in Bazemore?36 
Thus, the Supreme Court in Ledbetter failed to give due weight to the 
congressional intent to extend specific filing limitation protections to 
230 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 n.2 (2007) (citation 
omitted). 
231 Id. at 2183; see Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach to Disparate Impact and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,72 OR. L. REV. 253,256-57 (1993). 
232 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2)). 
233 Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the one-time adoption 
of a new seniority system that "had its genesis in sex discrimination"). 
234 S. Rep. No. 101-315, at 54 (1990). The Sponsors' Interpretative Memorandum in 1991 
explained: "This legislation should be interpreted as disapproving the extension of [Lorance] to 
contexts outside of seniority systems." (quoting 137 CONGo REC. 29046, 29407 (1991)). 
235 S. Rep. No. 101-315 (1990). No Senate Report was submitted with the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which was materially identical to the proposed 1990 Act. See also 137 CONGo REC. 29046, 
29047 (1991). 
236 S. Rep. No. 101-315, at 54 (1990). 
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plaintiffs bringing disparate pay claims under Title VII as amended by 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
C. PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO REMEDY THE EFFECTS OF LEDBETTER 
The legislative reaction to five controversial employment 
discrimination decisions in 1989 including Lorance, which resulted in 
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, serves as a model for Congress to act in 
response to Ledbetter.237 The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, H.R. 2831, 
(hereinafter "H.R. 2831"), which was passed in the House of 
Representatives on July 31, 2007 by a 225 to 199 vote,238 is narrowly 
designed to reverse the Ledbetter decision without upsetting any other 
current law.239 The House Committee on Education and Labor 
acknowledged H.R. 2831 to be a remedy similar to that created by 
Congress after Lorance, stating that Lorance has been superseded by 
Congress, and likewise, Ledbetter would be reversed with this bill. 240 
The Ledbetter decision applies to Title VII pay discrimination cases 
affecting not only women, but also those involving race, color, national 
origin, and religion. 241 The Committee found that, if undisturbed, the 
Ledbetter decision might also affect pay discrimination under parallel 
employment discrimination statutes that are patterned on Title VII, such 
as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter ADEA) or the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter ADA).242 H.R. 2831 was 
thus intended to amend the CRA of 1964, the ADEA, the ADA, and the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to clarify that a discriminatory compensation 
decision or other practice that is unlawful under such laws occurs each 
time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory compensation 
decision or other practice or when a person is affected by the decision or 
237 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (Westlaw 2008), which allows for Title VII liability 
arising from an intentionally discriminatory seniority system both at the time of its adoption and at 
the time of its application. 
238 Roll No. 768, 153 CONGo REC. 124 (2007). 
239 H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 9 (2007). 
240 H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 29 (2007). The report notes that while the Committee cannot 
foresee "every fact pattern" in which charges might be brought within 180/300 days of an act that 
effectuates a past decision to discriminate, the application of the seniority system in Lorance was 
one and paycheck issuance in Ledbetter was another. In the Committee Report's analysis of the 
Amendment, the differences between this provision and the Lorance legislative fix for seniority 
systems, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2), are specified to "ensure that Ledbetter is fully and 
clearly reversed." The distinctions in the terms used in the 1991 Amendment and H.R. 2831 are 
explained as having no substantive difference. 
24142 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a). 
242 H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 14 (written testimony of Wade Henderson, President and CEO 
ofthe Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, at 4). 
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practice, including each time compensation is paid.243 According to the 
congressional committee findings, the limitation imposed by the Court 
on the filing of discriminatory compensation claims ignores the reality of 
wage discrimination and is at odds with the comprehensive application of 
the civil rights laws that Congress intended. 244 
H.R. 2831 would amend the CRA of 1964 by adding language that 
clarifies when an unlawful employment practice occurs with respect to 
discrimination in compensation.245 The bill states that 
A discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted 
when an individual becomes subject to the decision or practice, or 
when an individual is affected by application of the decision or 
practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is 
paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other 
. 246 
practIce. 
H.R. 2831 also states that liability may accrue and an aggrieved person 
may obtain relief, including recovery of back pay for up to two years 
preceding the filing of the charge, where the unlawful employment 
practices that have occurred during the charge filing period are similar or 
related to practices that occurred outside the time for filing a charge.247 
In passing H.R. 2831, the House rejected the Court's reasoning that 
the statute of limitations starts to run upon the "mere decision to 
discriminate" and not also upon the employer's implementation of that 
discriminatory decision.248 The Committee clearly stated that an 
employer who decides to discriminate should be subject to challenge 
with every repeated instance of the employer effectuating that 
decision.249 The Committee Report clarified that because current and 
future instances of discrimination "must not be immunized by a cramped 
reading of when an unlawful employment practice occurs" for purposes 
of the statute of limitations, pay discrimination occurs both when an 
employer decides to discriminate and also when the employer actually 
carries out the discriminatory decision.25o As noted in the Committee 
Report, H.R. 2831 intends to "reverse Ledbetter in order to ensure the 
robust application of Title VII [and other laws] to fully protect workers 
243 See The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, H.R. 2831, II Oth Congo (2007). 
244 See H.R. 2831, II Oth Congo § 2(2) (2007). 
245 See H.R. 2831, II Oth Congo § 3(3)(A) (2007). 
246 ld. 
247 See H.R. 2831, II Oth Congo § 3(3)(8) (2007). 
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from discrimination" and to "reassert the viability of discrimination 
claims with respect to pay.,,251 Thus, H.R. 2831 would provide some 
recourse, as intended by Title VII, to individuals who have suffered 
discriminatory pay. 
Similar legislation has been introduced in the Senate.252 The Fair 
Pay Restoration Act, S. 1843, (hereinafter "S. 1843") would amend Title 
VII of the CRA of 1964 and the ADEA to clarify that an unlawful 
practice occurs every time compensation is paid pursuant to a 
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice.253 Like H.R. 
2831, its counterpart in the Senate, S. 1843, would reverse Ledbetter and 
establish that the clock for filing a claim of discrimination starts when a 
discriminatory pay decision or practice is adopted, when a person 
becomes subject to the pay decision or practice, or when an individual is 
affected by the pay decision or practice, including whenever she receives 
a discriminatory paycheck. 
D. OPPOSITION TO A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
The bills have been subject to criticism. In the floor debate on the 
H.R. 2831, Representative Kay Granger, a Republican from Texas, 
argued that "to overturn the Supreme Court decision would allow for a 
flood of decades-old claims to resurface.,,254 Opponents of this 
legislation further claimed that it would encourage plaintiffs to sit on 
their right to sue and, because of the passage of time, put the employer at 
a disadvantage when a case is finally filed. 255 Opponents have also 
contended that H.R. 2831 would effectively eliminate the statute of 
limitations.256 
Another criticism is that the language used in H.R. 2831 is overly 
broad and allows for persons other than the injured employee to bring a 
discrimination claim. 257 The language of the bill uses the term 
"individual" instead of referring to the "aggrieved party" and refers to 
persons "affected by" a discriminatory decision. 258 Thus, the terms 
251 [d. 
252 The Fair Pay Restoration Act, S. 1843, II Oth Congo (2007), was introduced in the Senate 
July 20, 2007. 
253 
See S. 1843, II Oth Congo (2007). 
254 153 CONGo REc. 123 (2007); see also Christine Cave, Could a legislative fix to Ledbetter 
override a presidential veto?, 14 FEDERAL HUMAN RESOURCES WEEK 320 (Aug. 27, 2007). 
255 
H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 12 (2007). 
256 See Editorial, Fair Pay, the Right Way; The House overcorrects a Supreme Court decision, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 14,2007, at A12. 
257 
H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 52 (2007). 
258 
H.R. 2831, II Oth Congo § 3. 
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within the bill have been criticized as including more people than those 
actually "injured by" discrimination.259 Some critics have also argued 
that the bill should be revised to bar pay discrimination claims that are 
based on non-pay personnel decisions. 260 An example of a non-pay 
personnel decision would be when an employee is transferred to another 
position that happens to have a different, but not necessarily 
discriminatory, compensation scheme.261 These criticisms reflect 
employers' concerns that claims may be filed when there is no 
discriminatory reason for a change in an employee's salary. 
There is, however, little substance to the criticisms of the proposed 
legislation. The argument that a delay in bringing claims for 
discriminatory pay will unfairly disadvantage the employer runs contrary 
to the realities of proving a claim of discrimination. While a claimant 
might theoretically defer filing, doing so would only impose a greater 
burden on the claimant because it is the claimant who bears the burden of 
proof; the passage of time only makes it more difficult to meet that 
burden. 262 Also, it would be pointless for a victim to allow 
discriminatory paychecks to pile up over several years because the back 
pay award authorized in the bill is limited to two years.263 For example, 
if an employee brought a ten-year-old claim, she would in essence forfeit 
the right to make a claim for eight years of back pay, since the back pay 
award would be limited to two years.264 
Furthermore, the criticism that the bill's language is overly broad is 
without merit.265 Individuals' ability to bring claims is limited by the 
doctrine of standing; a party may bring a claim only if she can 
demonstrate that she has suffered some injury?66 An uninjured 
individual would undoubtedly fail to establish a prima facie claim of 
259 H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 52 (2007). 
260 See H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 49 (2007). 
261 [d. 
262 H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 18 (2007). 
263 H.R. 2831 § 3(B) ("In addition to any relief authorized by section 1977a of the Revised 
Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981a), liability may accrue and an aggrieved person may obtain relief as 
provided in subsection (g)(I), including recovery of back pay for up to two years preceding the filing 
of the charge, where the unlawful employment practices that have occurred during the charge filing 
period are similar or related to unlawful employment practices with regard to discrimination in 
compensation that occurred outside the time for filing a charge."). 
264 See Editorial, Fair Pay, the Right Way; The House overcorrects a Supreme Court decision, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 14,2007, at A12. 
265 See H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 31 (2007) (noting no substantive difference in the term 
"individual" versus "aggrieved person"). 
266 Standing is defined as "a party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement 
of a duty or right." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1172 (Abridged 8th ed. 2005). 
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discrimination.267 Additionally, there are sufficient legal protections for 
employers who contend that they are disadvantaged by unreasonable or 
prejudicial delay.268 For example, an employer may raise a laches 
defense to cut off a plaintiff s right to sue if the plaintiff unreasonably 
delays in filing and as a result harms the defendant,269 even if the 
employee has met the filing requirements for Title VII. 270 
Moreover, H.R. 2831 maintains the 180/300 day statutory 
requirement for filing discrimination charges with the EEOC. 271 It does 
not extend that time limit. 272 Thus, to have a viable claim, a victim of 
pay discrimination must file a charge within 180/300 days of receiving 
discriminatory pay. The House Report makes it clear that if the 
discriminatory pay were received more than 180/300 days before the 
filing of the charge, the claim would be untimely under the Act. 273 
Rather than encouraging employers to run out the clock and continue 
reaping the financial rewards of paying someone less for discriminatory 
reasons, as Ledbetter permits, H.R. 2831 is designed to encourage 
employers to stop paying individuals in an unlawful, discriminatory 
fashion. Such incentive to stop discrimination existed in law prior to the 
267 H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 53 (2007). 
268 H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 17 (2007); see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
127 S. Ct. 2162, 2186 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Doctrines such as waiver, estoppel, and 
equitable tolling allow us to honor Title VII's remedial purpose without negating the particular 
purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.") (quoting Nat'l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002)). 
269 See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1975). Laches is the 
equitable doctrine by which a court denies relief to a claimant who has unreasonably delayed in 
asserting the claim, when that delay has prejudiced the party against whom relief is sought. See 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (Abridged 8th ed. 2005). 
270 The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007: Hearing Before the House Education and Labor 
Committee, I 10th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) (written testimony of Deborah Brake, Law Professor at the 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, at II); see Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121 (noting the defense of 
laches may be invoked to block an employee's suit if a plaintiff unreasonably delays in bringing suit 
and as a result the defendant was substantially prejudiced by that delay); see, e.g., Pande v. Johns 
Hopkins Univ., 598 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Md. 1984) (finding an unreasonable ten-year delay between 
the filing of EEOC charges and the commencement of suit where plaintiff was represented by 
counsel from the time charges were first filed and plaintiff had vicarious notice of his right to request 
a right-to-sue letter); Boone v. Mech. Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1979) (dismissing a 
case due to laches after plaintiff was informed on several occasions that he could have a right-to-sue 
letter and institute a civil action but waited seven years to take action). 
271 
H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 18 (2007). 
272 ld. 
273 1d. If an employee left employment and is no longer receiving compensation from the 
employer or because the employer rectified the discriminatory pay and now has been paying the 
employee in a nondiscriminatory and lawful fashion for at least 180/300 days, a charge would be 
untimely under this bill. See H.R. 2831, 11 Oth Congo (2007). 
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Court's decision in Ledbetter and H.R. 2831 and S. 1843 ensure that it 
will exist after Ledbetter as weI I. 274 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Returning to Violet's case, under Ledbetter, a woman earning sixty 
percent of what her male counterparts earn because of unlawful 
discrimination would be precluded from bringing a claim even if she 
received the discriminatorily low paychecks within the statutory filing 
period. Unfortunately, Violet's example is more than a simple 
hypothetical; it is reality for many working women. A recent study by 
the American Association of University Women found that one year out 
of college, women earn eighty percent of what men earn, and ten years 
later they earn only sixty-nine percent.275 With a record sixty-nine 
million women in the workforce, wage discrimination could have a 
significant economic effect on a staggering number of employees. 276 
Considering the prevalence of the pay gap, the legal standard established 
by Ledbetter will undoubtedly affect the rights of employees who are 
legitimately suffering from pay disparity. 
Ledbetter is inconsistent with the intent of the statutory protections 
against employment discrimination that Congress has established. The 
rule developed by Ledbetter frustrates the enforcement of Title VII by 
insulating current discriminatory conduct from challenge. In its holding, 
the Court failed to recognize the nature of wage discrimination. As a 
result, employers can easily escape liability merely by remaining 
secretive about discriminatory pay decisions during the statutory period, 
and once that time has passed they are essentially free to discriminate 
274 H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 18 (2007). 
275 H.R. Rep. No. 110-237, at 29 (Strengthening the Middle Class: Ensuring Equal Pay for 
Equal Work, Hearing Before the Education and Labor Committee, I 10th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007) 
(written testimony of Catherine Hill, Research Director at the American Association of University 
Women, at I)). The AAUW's analysis further demonstrated that female full-time workers earn less 
than male full-time workers in nearly every field they work. After controlling for factors such as 
major, occupation, industry, workplace flexibility, experience, education, enrollment status, grade 
point average, institution selectivity, age, racelethnicity, region, marital status and children, a five 
percent difference in the earnings of male and female college graduates is unexplained. The 
AAUW's analysis showed that ten years after graduation there is a twelve percent difference in the 
earnings of male and female college graduates that is attributable only to gender. See also Linda 
Lopez, Women Have a Lang Way to Go to Close Gender Pay Gap, TUCSON CITIZEN, Aug. 30, 2007; 
U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Highlights of Women's Earnings in 
2005, Report 995, http://www.bls.gov/cpslcpswom2005.pdf (last visited on April 16, 2008) (noting 
that among workers aged 45 to 54, women earned 75% as much as men where as workers 25 to 34 
years old, women earned 89% as much as men). 
276 See U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Employment Status of Women and Men 
in 2005, http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheetslQf-ESWM05.htrn (last visited on April 16, 2008). 
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openly. Thus, Ledbetter encourages employers to cover up their actions 
related to unfair compensation. 
Defining when discrimination occurs is a question that has long 
troubled Congress and the courts. The history of Title VII is, in part, a 
historical pattern of the courts interpreting the statute and Congress 
responding to judicial decisions with further amendments to ensure that 
the Act fulfills its purpose. As was the case after Lorance, Congress 
again is confronted by a judicial decision that undermines the 
effectiveness of Title VII. While equity may allow a court to remedy the 
harsh effects of Ledbetter, only an amendment to Title VII will 
uniformly remedy the inequity created by Ledbetter and restore force to 
Title VII. 
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